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I. INTRODUCTION

In Florida, a criminal defendant found guilty of a felony is sentenced by
that trial judge, but before the judge sentences the defendant, the
prosecutor or the Department of Corrections must prepare a guidelines
sheet.' This sheet guides the discretion of the trial judge as to any sentence
not automatically set by other legislation (i.e., a minimum mandatory
sentence).2 The guidelines produce a presumptive sentence within a
recommended sentencing range, but allow the trial judge to depart upward
or downward from the recommended range.
The recommended range for the presumptive sentence derives from a
sentencing scoresheet that charts two factors. The first factor, the
offender's prior record, considers whether the offender was on probation
* Professors, Stetson University College of Law. The authors thank James Mancuso, a third
year student at Stetson University College of Law, for research assistance. Of course, any errors
remain the sole responsibility of the authors.
1. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0024(3) (Supp. 1998); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d)(1).
2. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d)(29).
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or parole at the time he committed the crime. The second factor, offense
and the impact of the criminal act, incorporates such matters as victim
injury and any other offenses at the same time as the primary offense.' The
sentencing scoresheet begins with a certain number of points based on the
general nature of the offense and then adds points based on defendant and
offense-specific data. If, for example, the defendant's only offense at
conviction was unarmed burglary of an occupied dwelling (a level 7
offense under the guidelines4 ) and there was no victim injury or prior
record, the defendant's presumptive or recommended sentence would be
twenty-one to thirty-five months. If, however, the offender has a previous
conviction for a similar burglary, was on post-prison release at the time of
the second burglary, and was a member of a criminal street gang, the
defendant's recommended sentence would be sixty-two to one-hundred
and four months.' The presumptive or recommended sentence is not
binding on the trial judge, however. As previously noted, trial judges can
depart upward or downward, if adequate reasons support the departure
sentence.6
Until this year, appellate review of departure sentences was available
to either the prosecutor or the defendant regarding the trial judge's
justifications for the departure sentence.7 But that is not the case in Florida
any more. New legislation, effective October 1, 1998, permits prosecutors
to appeal a defendant's sentence when the trial judge departs from that
defendant's presumptive sentence and sentences the defendant to less time
than that called for under the guidelines, but denies the defendant the right
to appeal an upward departure, when the trial judge sentences the
defendant to more than the presumptive sentence
This article addresses whether this startling new appeal provision in
Florida's Criminal Punishment Code is constitutional: Can the state give
itself the right to appeal downward departure sentences but deny the
reciprocal right of the defendant to appeal upward departure sentences?
Part II of this article sets the background for answering this question by
briefly sketching the history of sentencing guidelines in Florida, and how
the new appeal provision undermines the wise policy behind those
guidelines. Part III then outlines the infirmities of the new appeal provision
3. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0024(l)(a), (b) (Supp. 1998); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d).
4. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0022(3) (Supp. 1998).
5. See id. § 921.0024(1)(b), (2).
6. See id. §§ 921.001(6), .0016(2) (1997); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.703(d)(30)(a).
7. See FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1997). Review of thejudge's calculation ofthe presumptive
sentence based on the offense and offender computations was also available on appeal, see, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 678 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Ist DCA 1996), and would appear to remain so under current
law.
8. See Ch. 98-204, § 8, 1998 Fla. Laws 1934, 1963 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(1));
Ch. 97-194, § 8, 1997 Fla. Laws 3672, 3698 (same).
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under the double jeopardy, right-to-appeal, due process, and
proportionality provisions of both the United States and Florida
Constitutions. This article concludes by pleading for an emphatic rejection
of the new appeal provision.
II. THE ADVENT OF DETERMINATE SENTENCING
In the United States, indeterminate sentencing was the norm until the
end of the 1970s. 9 Judges had great discretion to fashion an appropriate
sentence based on the severity of the offense and the background of the
offender. Unfortunately, the seriousness of an offense and the background
of the offender often varied with the eye of the beholder. What a judge in
Tallahassee thought was a severe offense or a significant record might have
been different from the thoughts of a judge in Miami. Was it fair that the
offender in Miami got less punishment than the offender in Tallahassee,
when both the crimes and the defendants were practically
indistinguishable?
With indeterminate sentencing, the judge had complete discretion. The
only control over the judge was the maximum sentence provided by law,
and the parole board. Neither the prosecution nor the defense could appeal
a sentence between the statutory minimum and maximum. Under this
system, the judge decided who gotjail time and who got probation. Within
the maximum sentence provided by law, she set the sentencing range, and
after sentencing, the parole board decided who stayed in prison for the full
term and who got early release."0
But the trial judge's total discretion in indeterminate sentencing caused
a problem: disparate sentencing." Offenders convicted of similar crimes

9. See MICHAEL ToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4 (1996); SENTENCING REFORM IN
OVERCROWED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6, 11 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad
eds., 1997).
10. See TONRY, supra note 9, at 4.
i1. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY, at vii (1978) [hereinafter
SENTENCING GUIDELINES].

Justice demands that two individuals convicted of similar offenses, with similar
backgrounds and criminal histories, should receive sentences that are roughly the
same. Nevertheless, perceived disparities in sentencing have led to public loss of
confidence in the fair and impartial administration of criminal justice and have led
many to advocate the elimination of the sentencing discretion of the trial court
judge.
Id; see also N. Gary Holten & Roger Handberg, Florida'sSentencing Guidelines:Surviving-But
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with similar criminal histories were receiving different sentences. 2 Racial
bias also had infected the indeterminate sentencing process. 3 By the early
1980s, disparate sentencing had reached the point where it was causing
prisoner unrest and the sentencing reform movement began in earnest.' 4
Sentencing philosophy and practice have been in the process of reform
for the last twenty-five years, 5 and there has been a movement toward
determinate sentencing. 6 Determinate sentencing proposals can be

Just Barely, 73 JUDICATURE 259, 260 (1990).
Florida's Sentencing Guidelines arose out of the difficulties experienced by state
courts in the 1970's in achieving equity in the sentencing of felons. Many judges
and legislators agreed that too great a discrepancy existed across Florida's 20
criminal court circuits. It was believed that individuals received unreasonably
disparate sentences for equivalent crimes even when one considered individual
differences in prior prison and arrest records and specific crime-related variables.
Id.
12. See Robert M. Johnson & Eva M. Davis, Sentencing Reforms: Fairor Foul?, 61 J. ST.
GOV'T 177 (1988) ("Florida adopted sentencing guidelines in an effort to end disparities between
sentences meted out for like crimes, such as harsher sentences imposed in rural than in urban
areas.").
13. See Holten & Handberg, supranote 11, at 260; see also T. Christian Miller, Tough Crime
Measures Sent to Governor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 3, 1997, at 4B (stating that "state
sentencing guidelines.., were passed nearly 15 years ago to eliminate racially based disparities in
prison terms"). For a discussion of racial bias in mandatory minimum sentencing in Florida, see 2
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM'N, WHERE THE INIURED FLY FOR
JUSTICE 36

(199 1) (stating that whether the "mandatory [sentencing] minimum is applicable appears
to be related to the race of the defendant" and "whites are more likely than non-whites to be
sentenced below the applicable mandatory minimum"). For a discussion of racial bias in sentencing
nationwide, see Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) ("Studies
consistently report that racial minorities receive harsher and longer prison sentences."). But see
generallyJAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

OF CRMNAL COURTS (1977) (questioning this conclusion).
14. See Rebecca Jean Spitzmiller, Note, An Examination oflssues in the FloridaSentencing
Guidelines, 8 NOVA L.J. 687, 688 ("Prisoner unrest caused by blatant disparity in sentencing
additionally contributed to the need for reform.").
15. See TONRY, supra note 9, at v; Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 687.
16. See Gordon Bazemore, Sentencing Guidelines in Florida:A Critical View, 14 CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL. 7 (1983) ("Following the national trend toward determinate sentencing, the state of
Florida is soon expected to implement sentencing guidelines."). The term "determinate sentencing"
may be confusing. See Alan C. Sundberg et al., Florida'sInitial Experience with Sentencing
Guidelines, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 126, 126 n.4 (1983).
The scope of sentencing laws varies considerably from state to state .... Inherent
in the concept of determinate sentencing is the notion of a fixed or definite length
of sentence. However, because of the varying provisions governing
implementation (e.g. the function of the parole board and the application of gaintime, good-time, etc.), determinate sentencing schemes do not necessarily
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classified into three categories: mandatory, flat-time and presumptive.
Mandatory sentencing is really mandatory-minimum sentencing in which
the trial judge is free to sentence anywhere in a range between a
legislatively prescribed mandatory minimum period set for that particular
crime and the statutory maximum period set by law. With flat-time
sentencing, the defendant serves the exact sentence imposed by the trial
judge, and the sentence is not reduced by early release or parole, or for
good or gain time awarded to the defendant while incarcerated.
Presumptive sentencing or sentencing guidelines are akin to flat-time
sentencing in that the offender is sentenced to a legislatively set sentence
for the crime or crimes committed. However, unlike flat-time sentencing,
judges can depart from presumptive sentences, either up or down, by
considering aggravating or mitigating circumstances.' 7 The aggravating
and mitigating circumstances can be either set forth in the statute or
determined on a case-by-case basis by the judge.
A. FloridaAdopts Sentencing Guidelines
The movement for sentencing reform did not bypass Florida. Just like
the rest of the nation, Florida suffered from allegations of sentencing
disparity based on the unbridled discretion of indeterminate sentencing, as
well as allegations of race-based sentencing.'" As a consequence, the
perception of disparity caused the citizens of Florida to lose confidence in
the "fair and impartial administration of criminal justice."' 9 In response to
the allegations of sentence disparity, the Florida Supreme Court in 197820
established the Sentencing Study Committee (the "Committee") to
"examine the state's current sentencing practices.",2' The court's specific
charge to the Committee was to "examine the extent and causes of
sentence disparity and to explore the variety of sentencing alternatives
available... to reduce unreasonable sentence variation. 22 The Committee
primarily reviewed felony sentencing practices, and in April 1978, the
Committee presented its preliminary findings to the court.23 The
Committee recommended a combination of sentencing guidelines and a

guarantee that the offender will serve all of the sentence imposed.
Id.
17. See Sundberg et al., supra note 16, at 126.
18. See Holten & Handberg, supra note 11, at 260; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at vii.
20. See Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 687.
21. Alan C. Sundberg et al., A Proposalfor Sentencing Reform in Florida,8 FLA. ST.U. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1980).
22. Id.at 1-2.
23. See id. at 2.
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sentencing review panel.2 4 In September 1979, the Office of State Courts
Administrator was awarded a federal grant to test the feasibility of
developing and implementing statewide sentencing guidelines by using test
guidelines in four circuits. 2' An advisory board in each of the test circuits,
consisting of the chief judge of the circuit and eight ex officio members,
had the responsibility for "developing and implementing" the test
guidelines.26
Initially, the test circuits drafted guidelines based primarily on the past
sentencing practices of the judges in the particular circuits. 27 Then a
mathematical model was constructed that established six separate
categories, one for each offense category.2
After the categories were selected, 220 variables reflecting various
offense and offender characteristics were collected and identified as having
had the greatest influence in past sentencing decisions.29 Eventually, fifteen
variables pertaining to the chariacteristics of the offense and the offender
made the final test guidelines sheet: primary offense at conviction; second
offense at conviction; third offense at conviction; number of counts of
primary offense; prior adult convictions; priorjuvenile felony convictions;
legal status at time of the offense (i.e., was the defendant on probation or

24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 19-20.
See id. at 18.
See Sundberg et al., supra note 16, at 129.
See Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 692-93.
This historical approach resulted in a model which represented what sentencing
had been, rather than what it ought to be. Advisory boards were provided with a
sampling of felony cases concluded during the three previous years, thus insuring
a variety of judges decisions, and encompassing a broad range of cases. In all,
15,613 cases were sampled, consisting of 194 different criminal offenses. Some
offenses occurred far more frequently than others with sixty-five statutes making
up eighty-five percent of the felony caseload. These sixty-five statutory offenses
were categorized into six groups, by similarities among "offense and offender
characteristics." Statutory violations not occurring within this eighty-five percent
portion were not analyzed further.
From the eighty-five percent group, a random sample of 6,826 cases was taken,
of which 5,100 were coded and analyzed. Information variables were compiled
and statistically analyzed to identify decision making factors historically used by
judges. The advisory boards then qualitatively analyzed these factors, to prevent
the continued use of undesirable and inappropriate variables from being factored
into the guidelines. The remaining sentencing factors were used to develop a
mathematical model for explaining the sentencing practices historically used in the
four jurisdictions.

Id.
28. See Sundberg et al., supra note 16, at 132 (chart).
29. See id. at 133.
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parole at the time of conviction?); role of the offender (did the defendant
actually pull the trigger, or was he a mere accomplice?); type of weapon;
extent of victim injury; victim participation; prior criminal traffic record;
employment
status; evidence of drug sale or distribution; and type of
30
drug.
Next the "actual weight or point score," based on a "combination of the
statistical data gathered from past sentencing decisions" and "normative
decisions made by the advisory board" was assigned to each variable.3 '
Then,
points were assigned to each of the variables and a total score
was calculated. This score was then used to enter a onedimensional matrix with score ranges correlated to sentences.
A median sentence figure was recommended and
accompanied by a minimum and maximum range which may
be imposed at the discretion of the court. Departures from the
guidelines were to be accompanied by a written explanation.32
The test guidelines were put into place in the four test circuits on April 15,
1981. There were 2489 individuals sentenced under the test guidelines
from April 15, 1981, to April 15, 1982, 3 and the statistics gathered from
these sentences were collected by the Committee.
Chief Justice Alan C. Sundberg, who along with his staff had visited
the four circuits during the test of the guidelines, recommended the
creation of a sentencing guidelines commission to "develop and
periodically revise statewide guidelines.",3' Accordingly, the 1982
legislature created a Sentencing Guidelines Commission (the "Guidelines
Commission") to implement the recommendation of the Chief Justice.36
The Guidelines Commission held its organizational meeting on July 21,
1982, 37 and spent the next year developing statewide sentencing guidelines.
In July 1983, the Guidelines Commission "released drafts of the finalized
guidelines., 3 A "draft was published in the FloridaBarNews," 39 and after
some revisions, it was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.4 °

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 138 tbl. 4.
Id. at 140.
Id.at 141.
See id.
See id. at 146.
See Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 695.
See Sundberg et al., supra note 16, at 149.
See id.
at 151.
See Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 697.
Id.
See Inre Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848,849 (Fla.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I11

The 1983 guidelines approved by the court grouped "all felonies into
nine categories: (1) murder and manslaughter; (2) sexual offenses; (3)
robbery; (4) violent personal crimes; (5) burglary; (6) thefts, forgery and
fraud; (7) drugs; (8) weapons; and (9) all other felonies."41 For each
category there was a "different set of guidelines or matrixes with separate
scoresheets for each., 42 In multiple offense cases, the guidelines provided
that the scoresheet that would result in the most severe punishment was the
one to use.4 3 Provision was made in the 1983 guidelines for judges to
depart from the guidelines and give a more severe or a more lenient
sentence based on the facts of a particular case. To do this, the guidelines
provided that the judge must give his reasons for departing in writing,
which must be clear and convincing. The guidelines did not provide a
shopping list of acceptable reasons for departure, and it was left to the
judges to develop their own reasons.44 Allowing departure sentences
increased the ability of sentencing judges to use their discretion. It was
unbridled discretion that had created sentencing disparity and the need for
guidelines in the first place, but the thought was that permitting some
controlled discretion would promote warranted variation in sentencing as
opposed to the unwarranted pre-1983 sentencing variation. 45 And appellate
review was available to police departure sentences, as explained by two
commentators on the 1983 guidelines:
If the departure is a mitigation of the guidelines sentence, the
state has the right of appeal to the District Court of Appeal
1983).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Holten & Handberg, supra note 11, at 261.
Id.
See id.
See Spitzmiller, supra note 14, at 699.
See id. at 700. As stated by Justice Sundberg and his co-authors:
Although the purpose of sentencing guidelines was the reduction of unwarranted
sentence variation, the need for some variation was recognized and indeed
promoted. It was anticipated that from 15-20% of the sentencing decisions
routinely would fall outside of the recommended range. The trial judges were
cautioned that at no time should sentencing guidelines be viewed as the final word
in the sentencing process. The factors delineated were selected to ensure that
similarly situated offenders convicted of similar crimes receive similar sentences.
Because a factor was not expressly delineated on the score sheet did not mean that
it could not be used in the sentence decision-making process. The specific
circumstances of the offense could be used to either aggravate or mitigate the
sentence within the guideline range or, ifthe offense and offender characteristics
were sufficiently compelling, used as a basis for imposing a sentence outside of
the guidelines.

Sundberg et al., supra note 16, at 142.
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(DCA) for a ruling vacating the sentence and ordering the trial
court to sentence within the guideline range. If the sentence is
an aggravation, the defendant has the same right of appeal to
the DCA.46
Limiting judicial discretion was expected by some to have some
untoward effects on Florida's criminal justice system. 47 It was thought that

the 1983 guidelines, with their predetermined sentences, would end plea
bargaining and cause more jury trials because an offender's punishment
was fixed whether he pleaded guilty or went to trial. 4' But those who
thought that post-guidelines defendants with nothing to lose by going to
trial would clog the courts with jury trials were wrong. Statistics showed
that in 1984 the number of jury trials even went down in some
jurisdictions. 49 There was also a fear that the length of sentence per
offender would go down with the guidelines, but this fear, according to the
1984 data, was both realized and expected. 0

46. Holten & Handberg, supra note 11, at 261.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 261-62. There were some other expectations about the effect of the guidelines.
Prior to the advent of guideline sentencing, Florida's indeterminate sentencing scheme, according
to considerable anecdotal evidence, allowed some trial judges to punish defendants for insisting on
a trial. According to this evidence, if a defendant pleaded guilty, he would receive a lenient
sentence. If the defendant went to trial, he received a much harsher sentence upon conviction.
Although such a sentencing enhancement for a person exercising a constitutional right is clearly
improper, it was impossible in the pre-guidelines era to prove that an accused had been punished
for going to trial. With indeterminate sentencing, the judge had the unbridled discretion to sentence
a defendant to anything between probation and the maximum. Furthermore, with indeterminate
sentencing, there was no requirement for the judge to give any reason for handing down a harsh
sentence, as long as the sentence was below the maximum provided by law. By channeling judicial
discretion, sentencing guidelines were seen by some as a hedge against judges who liked to punish
defendants for going to trial.
49. See id. at 262.
50. See id. at 263.
As for the lengths of prison sentences, guidelines were designed to virtually
eliminate the extremely long sentences by using lengths of sentences actually
served as the basis for the projected ranges. In other words, Florida's guidelines
took parole into account, and the guidelines sentencing categories were thus more
realistic than the earlier indeterminate sentencing system. Very long sentences
(e.g., of more than 30 years) are especially unrealistic since only a fraction of the
time is served. Our earlier study indicated that, as expected, sentence lengths
declined somewhat, but the contribution of guidelines to this is not clear.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I I

B. The FloridaLegislatureResponds
Since the adoption of the 1983 guidelines, critics have said that the
guidelines are too lenient,5 and every legislative session since their
adoption has made them more punitive. 2 Some changes have been
designed to reverse guidelines decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. For
example, when the court ruled in 1985 that appellate courts must review
not only the trial judge's justification for departing from the guidelines, but
also the extent of the departure,5 3 the legislature abolished the right of
appellate courts to "review the extent a sentence departs from the
guidelines."54 And in 1986, the Florida Supreme Court held that departure
sentences must meet a clear-and-convincing standard," but the 1987
legislature changed that standard to a preponderance of the evidence. 6
In the 1987 session of the legislature, bills were introduced in the
Senate to abolish the guidelines and to "abolish the right to appeal a
sentence imposed outside the recommended range."57 In 1988, legislation
was again proposed to abolish the guidelines, but that proposal also failed.
The 1988 legislature, however, did allow trial judges some greater
sentencing discretion by in effect broadening the recommended ranges for
each presumptive sentence. 8 The 1988 legislature also reversed a decision
of the Florida Supreme Court, Whitehead v. State,5 9 that had held habitual
offenders subject to the guidelines. 6' The Whitehead decision had
infuriated prosecutors, and in response, the legislature passed a law
allowing judges to sentence habitual offenders more severely by sentencing
them outside the guidelines. 6 '
As of 1989, a dilemma began to emerge from the legislature's attempts
to make the guidelines more punitive. The more the legislature moved to

51. See Johnson & Davis, supra note 12, at 177 ("A 1986 survey by the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission of circuit judges showed 60 percent wanted to abolish the guidelines, 74
percent thought the guidelines were too lenient ... ").
52. See David B. Griswold, Florida's Sentencing Guidelines: Six Years Later, FED.

PROBATION, Dec. 1989, at 46, 46-47; Johnson & Davis, supra note 12, at 177.
53. See Albritton v. State, 476 So. 2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1985).
54. Johnson & Davis, supra note 12, at 177 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1997)).
55. See State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. 1986).
56. See Johnson & Davis, supra note 12, at 178 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (1997);

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701).
57. Id. at 177.

58. See id. at 178. The legislature accomplished this broadening by allowingjudges to deviate
one "cell" upward or downward on the guidelines grid without giving any written reasons, and the
one-cell deviation could not be appealed. See generally John Hogenmuller, Sentencing in Florida,
20 LAW & POL'Y 281, 290-91 (1998).
59. 498 So. 2d. 863, 866 (Fla. 1986).
60. See Johnson & Davis, supra note 12, at 178.
61. See id. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 775.084-.0843 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
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increase jail time and to fill up the prisons, the more the Department of
Corrections, in order to comply with population caps mandated by the
federal courts, used gain time and good time to let prisoners out.62 This
"fill-em-up, let-em-out" process had two effects on the guidelines. First,
making the guidelines more punitive increased Florida's prison population,
but greater use of gain and good time had the opposite effect: It made
sentences less punitive by reducing the guidelines sentence, a sentence that
had already been reduced in the hopes that the offender would serve the
actual time imposed.63 Second, since the awarding of gain and good time
was essentially discretionary with the Department of Corrections, the
discretion that was taken from the trial judges under the guidelines was
reinserted into the process, but given to prison personnel.' Although the
guidelines had the effect of controlling some of the unrestrained discretion
of sentencing judges, which had been causing disparate sentencing in the
pre-guidelines era, the discretionary use of good and gain time, to ease the
overcrowding caused by the legislature's toughening of the guidelines,
meant that instead of offenders receiving disparate sentences from trial
judges as they did before 1983, offenders began receiving disparate
releases from prison officials.65
By the 1990s legislative attention had shifted away from the 1983 goal
of "eliminating unwarranted disparity to the need to impose more frequent
and longer prison sentences. 66 In 1991, the legislature attempted to
address the dilemma of being tough on crime while controlling prison
overcrowding by hoping to increase the punishments for some crimes
while using non-incarcerative sentencing for others. 67 The 1991 legislature
"ordered the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to develop revised
statewide guidelines that would emphasize incarceration for violent and
repeat offenders, and provide alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent
the commission consider
offenders. Of equal importance was the directive
68
present and future state prison resources.,
The Guidelines Commission proposed a new model based in part on a
legislative committee report that dealt with prison overcrowding and
increasing sentencing disparity.69 In this report, dated November 1991, the

62. For a description of how gain time and good time operate to reduce the sentence actually
served by a defendant, see Bobbie Glover, How Much Time Will an Inmate Actually Serve?, FLA.
B.J., Dec. 1995, at 33.
63. See Griswold, supra note 52, at 49.
64. See id.
65. See id
66. Leonard Holton, The ContinuingEvolution of Sentencing Guidelines in Florida,FLA.
B.J., Dec. 1993, at 48, 48.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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Economic and Demographic Research Division of the Joint Legislative
Management Committee ofthe Florida Legislature (EDR) reported that the
goal of the 1983 guidelines, reducing sentencing disparity, was being
undermined by legislation that was increasing, not decreasing judicial
discretion.70
Acting on some of the EDR findings, the legislature passed new
sentencing guidelines effective in 1994 as part of a legislative package
known as the "Safe Streets Act."'" This Act sought to "[i]ncarcerate
violent and repetitive offenders, [e]nsure a greater percentage of time
served by providing that the policy created matched the resources that
would be available, and ...eliminate certain gain time provisions ....
This
version of the guidelines contained ten offense severity levels,
categorizing felony offenses from less severe (level 1) to more
severe (level 10). . . . This system allowed the flexibility to
rank different offenses, contained in the same statutory
chapter, into different offense levels depending on the
perceived seriousness of the offense. Prior record and
additional offenses at conviction were also allocated point
values based on offense severity level, rather than the old
method of felony degree."
While the "structure of the 1994 sentencing guidelines [had] little
similarity to the 1983 structure,"74 there were several features of guidelines

70. See ECONOMIC & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH Div., FLA. LEGISLATURE, AN ALTERNATIVE
TO FLORIDA'S CURRENT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION 18 (Nov. 1991) (on file with the authors).

The primary purpose for enacting sentencing guidelines was to assure that the type
and length of sentence imposed is determined by matters directly relevant to the
current offense and the offender's prior record rather than by the circuit in which
the offender is sentenced. Substantial progress was made toward this goal as a
result of sentencing guidelines. However, changes that have been made to the
guidelines structure-such as allowing one cell discretion in sentencing and
allowing offenders who score in the lowest cell of the sentencing schedule to
receive a prison sentence-have undermined the progress that has been made
toward uniform sentencing.
Id.
71.

See FLA. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, FLA. SENTENCING COMM'N, Sentencing Guidelines

1995-96 Annual Report [hereinafter Annual Report] (Sept. 1i, 1998).
<http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/sgannual/9596/iintro.html> (visited Nov. 16, 1998).
72. Id.
73. Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 295.
74. Annual Report, supra note 71, at 3.
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law that remained constant.75 The "ability to depart from a guidelines
sentence was continued, and judges were now given a listing of acceptable,
but not exclusive, reasons for departure. This compilation codified existing
case law and practice."" Regarding appeals, "[dieparture sentences were
made subject to appellate review, but only regarding the justification for
departure. The extent of the departure was specifically exempted from
appellate review.""
Nevertheless, the pressure continued to abolish or radically change the
guidelines. For example, in 1996, one commentator wrote in the Florida
Bar Journal:
Appeals arising out of criminal cases constitute a substantial
portion of the caseload of the various Florida district courts of
appeal. This is not a new trend. When one looks beyond the
mere caseload statistics, however, one trend seems apparent.
More and more, the appellate courts are involved in
sentencing matters as opposed to trial and pretrial matters
relating to the validity of the conviction. . . .With the
enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines Act in 1984, Florida
took a quantum leap into sentencing complexity. One has only
to glance at the pages of the Florida Digest to realize the vast
amount of appellate activity that the guidelines have spawned
....Abolition of the guidelines alone would greatly reduce
the complexity of sentencing in Florida and it is tempting to
suggest such a solution.7"
Although "the guidelines were meeting their avowed goals of reducing
sentencing disparities and incarcerating more violent offenders for longer
periods of time,"79 the push to abolish the guidelines continued. In
response, the legislature enacted the new Criminal Punishment Code
(C.P.C.).80 Effective for offenses committed after October 1, 1998, the
C.P.C. mandates
a scoresheet that will be very similar to the current scoresheet
but the policy essentially eliminates the issue of upward
departure by providing that any offense can receive up to the
statutory maximum [and there is no right to appeal such an
upward departure.] Downward departures will still require a
75. See Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 296.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. William A. Haddad, "Appellate Sentencing" in Florida,A Pleafor Less Complexity at
the Trial Level, FLA. B. J., May 1996, at 28, 30.
79. Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 303.
80. See 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 204, 1934; 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 194, 3672.
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written reason and can be appealed. This means that under the
Criminal Punishment Code, a defendant can receive a
minimum of the[] lowest possible guidelines sentence or a
maximum of 5, 15, or 30 years for a third, second, or first
degree felony, respectively, or life for a life felony."'
The new C.P.C. "contains provisions virtually identical to those
contained in the sentencing guidelines." 2 However, two coordinated
concepts have been incorporated into the C.P.C. that seriously undermine
Florida's commitment to determinate sentencing and to avoiding
sentencing disparity. 3 The first concept "allows the trial judge to impose
the statutory maximum permitted by the felony degree for any offense,
including a probation violation. Thus, the sentencing judge may go above
the upper end of the recommended sentence without filing written reasons
for departure." 4 The second concept "provides for appeals [by the state]
only if the sentence is below the permissible sentencing range." 5 Through
these provisions the new C.P.C. allows sentencing judges to ignore the
upper limit of the guidelines sentence without any fear of appellate
review. 6 So, judges may depart upward for any reason, or for no reason at
all, raising the possibility of a return to arbitrary and discriminatory
disparities in criminal sentences.
The new C.P.C., with its move away from determinate sentencing
toward mandatory minimum sentencing, 7 has met with mixed reviews.

81. JoAnne Leznoff, Sentencing Guidelines Scored No Points This Session, CORRECTIONAL
COMPASS,
Oct.
1997,
at
5
(visited
Nov.
11,
1999)
<http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/compass/97l0/index.html>.
82. Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 303.
83. See id.
84. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 921.0024(2) (Supp. 1998).
The total sentence points shall be calculated only as a means of determining the
lowest permissible sentence. The permissible range for sentencing shall be the
lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as
defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before
the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences
concurrently or consecutively.
Id. Another provision of the C.P.C. allows the sentencing judge go beyond the statutory maximum
ifthe recommended guideline range exceeds that maximum. See FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (1997);
Mays v.State, 717 So. 2d 515, 516 (1998).
85. Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 303. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(1) (Supp. 1998) ("The
imposition of a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence is subject to appellate review under
chapter 924 ...").
86. Another provision eliminates substance abuse or addiction as a mitigating factor. See
Hogenmuller, supra note 58, at 304.
87. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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Prosecutors applaud it. As stated by Lee County State Attorney Joe
D'Alessandro, "This is ultimately going to be positive and a good solution
for crime." 8'8 Speaking more equivocally, the Department of Corrections
has stated: "The impact of the Criminal Punishment Code is indeterminate
as the parameters of permissible sentences are too broad to allow for
reliable forecasting. How many inmates, what type, and how long they will
stay with us-we'll just have to wait and see!"8' 9 Expressing a negative
viewpoint, Circuit Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr., a member of the Florida
Guidelines Commission and an "outspoken champion of sentencing
guidelines," thinks that "minimum mandatory sentences inherently work
an injustice."9 °
Judge Eaton clearly has the strongest side of this argument. Mandatory
minimum sentencing has been roundly criticized as a decided overreaction
to the problem of crime. 9' More importantly, the legislature's move away
from determinate sentencing flies in the face of the last twenty-five years
of sentencing reform, both nationally and in Florida.92 Further, the
legislature's action promises a return to the sorry days of disparate
sentencing, with its obvious undercurrent of racial discrimination.93
Whatever the legislature's dissatisfactions with sentencing guidelines, it
should act immediately to repeal this ill-considered undermining of the
guidelines' basic goal.
With the adoption of the new C.P.C., the Florida legislature has made
an unwise choice to increase judicial discretion in sentencing by allowing
prosecutors to appeal downward departures, while denying defendants the
right to appeal upward departures. But now the courts will have a choice:
Whether to hold the C.P.C. and its disparate treatment of the appeal of
upward and downward departures unconstitutional?

88. Jim Ash, Florida About to Give Its Judges and Prosecutorsa New Arsenal,Gannett News
Service, June 20, 1997, at 1, available at 1997 WL 8830623.
89. Leznoff, supra note 81; see also Ash, supra note 88, at 6 ("But what worries Florida
prison officials most is the state's 1997 Prison Release Reoffender Punishment Act, designed to
target repeat offenders with the harshest penalties the law allows. It took effect May 30, and prison
officials project it will cost from $1.8 billion to $2.4 billion within the next decade"). The
legislature sought to prepare itself for the impact of the Criminal Punishment Code and other
similar statutes by engaging in a construction program over the last several years that doubled the
state's prison capacity and it has passed legislation that has "increased the average prison stay from
30 percent to 66 percent." Id. at 2.
90. Ash, supra note 88, at 6-7.
91. See, e. g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991); Gary T.
Lowenthal, MandatorySentencingLaws: Underminingthe Effectiveness ofDeterminateSentencing
Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 61 (1993); Comment, Determinate Sentencing and Judicial
Participationin Democratic Punishment, 108 HARV. L. REv. 947, 949 (1995).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 15-77.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPEAL PROVISION
IN FLORIDA'S CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE

A. Florida'sCriminalPunishment Code andDouble Jeopardy
The year 1980 constituted a significant turning point in the history of
American criminal sentencing. The widespread commitment to
indeterminate sentencing prior to that year94 was due in significant part to
the prevailing interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution. This interpretation limited the options available to a
state seeking to establish a determinate sentencing regime by making the
adoption of sentencing guidelines constitutionally suspect. Maintenance of
a proper guidelines system necessitates appellate review of sentences with
the effective capacity to both raise and lower sentences imposed by the trial
judge.95 Yet as Justice Brennan noted in 1980, prior to that year the United
States Supreme Court as well as lower courts had "consistently assumed
that an increase in the severity of a sentence subsequent to its imposition
...constitutes

multiple punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy

Clause., 96 So raising sentences on or after appeal by the prosecution, a
possibility necessary for a proper guidelines system to function, seemed
unconstitutional.
But in 1980 by a five-to-four vote, the Court's holding in UnitedStates
v. DiFrancesco97 overturned this expected rule of constitutional
adjudication. In DiFrancesco,the Court held that a statute allowing both
prosecution and defense appeals of the sentences given "dangerous special
offenders" under the Organized Crime Control Act of 19709 did not
94. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
95. "The integrity of the system depends on the ability of appellate courts to correct
sentencing errors." United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.D.C. 1997). See generally
Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L.
REV. 1077, 1100 (1992); Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, American BarAssociation Adopts New
Sentencing Standards,in TONRY & HATLESTAD, supra note 9, at 17, 18. Appellate modification of
sentences may be accomplished directly, as in the federal system, or indirectly, as in Florida, where
the appellate court remands for resentencing in light of its opinion.
96. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 144-45 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1957); United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307
(1931)). Justice Brennan also quoted a similar statement from a separate opinion written that same
year by Justice Rehnquist, a member ofthe five-man DiFrancescomajority. See DiFrancesco,449
U.S. at 145-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 703
(1980) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting)).
97. Id. at 139 (majority opinion); see id.at 136-37.
98. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. X, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 922, 948-51 (1970) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3575(e), (f), 3576) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat.
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violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. At the close of its lengthy opinion, the
DiFrancescomajority noted the "limited.., scope" and "narrow[] focus[]"
of the statute upheld, finding that "[i]t is not an example of 'Government
oppression' against which the Double Jeopardy Clause stands guard." 99
Further, the majority acknowledged the relevance of its decision to the
broader question of sentencing reform, suggesting that the majority was
aware of the possibilities its ruling opened:
It has been observed elsewhere that sentencing is one of the
areas of the criminal justice system most in need of reform.
Judge Frankel... has observed that the basic "problem" in
the present system is "the unbridled power of the sentencers
to be arbitrary and discriminatory." Appellate review creates
a check upon this unlimited power, and should lead to a
greater degree of consistency in sentencing.'°°
The implication of this language is that the DiFrancescomajority was
willing to trade the protections formerly offered defendants by the Double
Jeopardy Clause for the benefits, to defendants as well as to the state, that
greater consistency in sentencing would provide. The majority thus
signaled its willingness to allow jurisdictions to use appellate review to
facilitate determinate sentencing, opening the way for the move to
sentencing guidelines.
The closeness of the DiFrancescodecision-there were dissents by
Justices Brennan and Stevens, with the latter relying on Justice Harlan's
legendary opinion in North Carolinav. Pearce'0 -renders significant the
limitations noted by the majority. The right to appellate review of
sentences approved in DiFrancescowas a reciprocal right, available both
to the government and to the defendant." 2 This reciprocity was essential
to the goal of reducing sentencing disparity and thus essential to the tradeoff on which DiFrancescois based. It, along with the limited scope and
narrow focus ofthe provision, likely reduced the Court's concern regarding
"[g]overnment oppression." A provision that was both broader and

1837, 1987 (1984)).
99. DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 142.
100. Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted) (quoting MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973)).

with whom White, Marshall, and Stevens, Ri., join, dissenting); id. at
101. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the "powerful" and "straightforward analysis" in North
153-54 (Stevens, J.,
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 746-47 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Writing in 1994, Justice Shaw of the Florida Supreme Court noted that DiFrancesco was "an
unfortunate decision" rendered "by the narrowest of margins." Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 389
(Fla. 1994) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only); see infra note 106.
102. See DiFrancesco,at 120 n.2 (majority opinion).
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nonreciprocal might not have fared so well before the Court.'03
The sentencing guidelines regimes adopted after 1980 ofcourse applied
more broadly than the statutory provision approved in DiFrancesco,but
the reciprocal appeals allowed under these provisions were a guarantee that
the government would use its right to appeal to reduce sentencing
disparity, rather than to oppress individual defendants. There is, of course,
no such guarantee under the appeal provision of Florida's Criminal
Punishment Code. As noted earlier, the state may appeal downward
departures from the presumptive sentence under the C.P.C., but defendants
no longer have the right to appeal upward departures. This system gives the
prosecution two bites at the sentencing apple, thereby increasing the
potential for oppression, with only a negligible concomitant effect on
sentencing disparity. Thus, the C.P.C.'s appeal provision fails to observe
the trade-off on which DiFrancescois premised, and it is highly doubtful
whether that Court would have upheld the C.P.C.'s appeal provision if it
had been before the Justices in 1980. For the same reasons, today's courts
should find the appeal provision unconstitutional under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 4
In interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Florida
Constitution,0 5 Florida courts have followed a pattern similar to that taken
by the United States Supreme Court. While it was clear prior to
DiFrancesco that double jeopardy barred sentencing appeals by the
prosecution, the Florida Supreme Court relented from this position in order
to allow the implementation of sentencing guidelines. 6 But the rights to
sentencing appeals previously approved by the Florida Supreme Court
have all been reciprocal, extending equally to prosecution and defense.
Because the new C.P.C. deviates from this pattern, its provision for
nonreciprocal government appeals is constitutionally suspect.
Further, even after DiFrancesco,Florida courts have shown a greater

103. The decision in Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246,2250-57 (1998), shows the Court's
continuing divisions regarding the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing. In
Monge, the Court held, again by a five-to-four vote, that double jeopardy does not bar relitigation
regarding a sentencing enhancement factor; there were vigorous dissents by Justices Stevens and
Scalia. See id at 2253-57.
104. One remedy for this unconstitutionality would be to strike the state's ability to appeal a
downward departure. But this would be tantamount to a discretionary sentencing regime, with the
guidelines sentence a mere recommendation - something the Florida Legislature specifically
sought to avoid, at least regarding downward departures from the presumptive sentence.
Accordingly, a better remedy for the double jeopardy violation in the appeal provision of the
Criminal Punishment Code is to strike them all as nonseverable and reinstate the pre-1998
provisions regarding sentencing appeals until the legislature has an opportunity to act.
105. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
106. Cf Harris v. State, 645 So. 2d 386, 338 (Fla. 1994) (allowing prosecution appeal from
refusal to impose sentence as a habitual offender).
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willingness to find double jeopardy violations in sentencing appeals than
have their federal counterparts. 0 7 This implicit reliance on a broader
construction of the state constitutional right provides additional support for
holding that the appeal provision of Florida's Criminal Punishment Code
violates the state constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, as well
as the federal.'
B. Florida'sCriminalPunishment Code
and the Right to Appeal
Even though the public considers the right to appeal an integral part of
Americanjurisprudence, the constitutional status of this right at the federal
level is remarkably uncertain. While the United States Constitution does
not require appeals in criminal cases,"°9 several United States Supreme
Court opinions hold that once the right to appeal is granted, infringement
of that right may be unconstitutional. "0 The most significant of these cases
is North Carolinav. Pearce,"' which found that while double jeopardy
does not bar a greater sentence on reconviction after a successful defense

107. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 559 So. 2d 204, 206-07 (Fla. 1990) (increase in sentence
prohibited despite subsequent change in law that would have allowed the increase, citing the double
jeopardy principles set forth in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)), see infra text
accompanying notes 109-14, even though the PearceCourt found double jeopardy irrelevant to the
sentencing issue before it); Thomas v. State, 648 So. 2d 298, 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (increase
in sentence pursuant to motion to correct sentence filed during pendency of appeal was "violative
of a defendant's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy"); Davis v. State, 587 So. 2d 580
(Fla. Ist DCA 1991) (court's sua sponte reconsideration of its previous decision not to sentence
defendant as a habitual offender constitutes double jeopardy, a holding distinguished by the state
supreme court in Harris,645 So. 2d at 388); Jano v. State, 559 So. 2d 1270, 1272 n.2 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1990) (limiting potential upward departure to sentence previously imposed, because of
defendant's "protection against double jeopardy") (citing "North Carolina v. Pierce [sic]"); Colvin
v. State, 549 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (upward departure by a subsequent judge after
initial sentencing judge's refusal to depart upward was "contrary to the Constitutional prohibitions
relating to double-jeopardy," citing both the federal and state constitutions); Hinton v. State, 446
So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) ("resentencing on the same charge is a violation of double
jeopardy," citing both the federal and state constitutions).
108. Regarding the appropriate remedy for this constitutional violation, see supra note 104.
109. See generallyEvitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651
(1977); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
110. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974) (prosecutor's raising charge on
defendant's trial de novo after appeal from conviction of lesser charge held unconstitutional
retaliation for exercise of appellate right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963)
(having granted right to appeal, state could not condition appointment of appellate counsel for
indigent defendant on showing of merit); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,20 (1956) (having granted
right to appeal, state could not condition appeal on purchase of transcript that indigent defendant
could not afford).
111. 395U.S. 711 (1969).
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appeal," 2 the possibility that the greater sentence might be punishment for
the defendant's exercise of the right to appeal requires adoption of a
prophylactic rule as a matter of constitutional law:
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have
concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe
sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his
doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be
based on objective information concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time
of the original sentencing proceeding." 3
Thus, a judge may give a defendant reconvicted after a successful appeal
a sentence longer than the one previously imposed only if the judge can
cite events occurring after the first sentencing that would justify the
increase. Such a rule "free[s the defendant] of apprehension of. . . a
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge," sparked by the
defendant's successful appeal of the previous conviction.14
Of course, the right to appeal itself serves a similar prophylactic
function. A defendant may fear retaliation from a trial judge for exercise
of one or more pre-trial and trial rights, but the defendant's right to appeal
such retaliatory decisions provides a considerable measure of protection.
That protection is lost, however, when the state takes away the right to
appeal, as Florida has done with sentences in the new C.P.C. Under the
C.P.C., the trial judge is free to punish the defendant by imposing an
unreviewable upward departure for exercising such basic protections as the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and even the
right to trial itself."5 If a prophylactic rule is constitutionally required in
the Pearcesituation, a similar rule-requiring that the judge indicate the
"objective information" justifying the upward departure, with such
information subject to appellate review-surely should be required under
a statute like Florida's C.P.C.
While Supreme Court authority exists that the state may, in some
circumstances, put the defendant to the cruel choice of either waiving a
right or risking a higher sentence, these cases involve either a legislative

112. See id. at 719-21. It was from this holding that Justice Harlan dissented, see id. at 744-51
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
The Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to greater sentences on reconviction after
appeal. See 395 U.S. at 722-23.
113. Pearce,395 U.S. at 726. The Court based this constitutional holding on the Due Process
Clause. See id. at 725.
114. Id. at 725. The Court quotes a letter from a defendant that poignantly demonstrates the
effect of this fear of retaliation. See id. n.20.
115. See id. n.20; supra note 48.
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determination that the higher sentence is justified," 6 or the similar decision
of a prosecutor, which is subject to both trial and appeal.' The situation
under Florida's C.P.C. is entirely different, for the legislature, by
establishing a presumptive sentence under the guidelines, has specifically
determined that a higher sentence is not required; further, the judge's
choice of a higher sentence under the C.P.C. is final, with no permissible
review. Thus the C.P.C. more closely resembles the Pearcecircumstances,
in which the possibility of impermissible motives convinced the Court of
the need for a prophylactic rule." 8
The right-to-appeal argument against the C.P.C. is even stronger under
the Florida Constitution, which for most of the state's history has
guaranteed the criminal defendant's appellate rights. The single gap in this
protection was the period following the Florida Supreme Court's 1985
decision in State v. Creighton,"9 which, in a remarkable dictum, opined
that a 1972 constitutional revision had abrogated the previously existing
constitutional right to appeal. 2 2 But, in 1996 the Florida Supreme Court
corrected its own previous lapse by receding from Creighton.
In In re Amendments to the FloridaRules ofAppellate Procedure,121the
Florida Supreme Court examined proposed appellate rules in light of
recently passed legislation regulating appeals in criminal cases. Without
dissent, the court disapproved Creighton-perhaps for the extensive
reasons set forth in Justice Anstead's concurring opinion 22 -with the full
court declaring, "[W]e construe the language of article V, section 4(b) as

116. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) (under murder statute, lower
sentence available to defendant who pleads nolo contendere); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
751 (1970) (under kidnapping statute, capital punishment is not possible if defendant waives jury
trial).
117. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978) (prosecutor threatened to raise
charge if defendant refused plea bargain).
118. Similar considerationsjustify the rule, followed in some federal circuits, that a negotiated
agreement not to appeal a sentence does not bar an appellate consideration of the allegation that the
sentence resulted from certain impermissible motives. See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 165
F.3d 169, 174 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 748 (2d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732 (4h Cir. 1994); United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22-23 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 & n.18 (11t' Cir. 1993); United States
v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4' Cir. 1992); cf United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555-56 (2d
Cir. 1996) (citing "institutional and societal values that transcend the individual's interests"); see
also United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 48 (D.D.C. 1997) (refusing to enforce sentencing
appeal waivers that do not similarly limit the government's right to appeal).
119. 469 So. 2d. 735, 739 (Fla. 1985).
120. See id at 739.
121. 696 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam). Justice Overton concurred in the result only.
The opinion also appears verbatim at 685 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1996).
122. See 696 So. 2d at 1107-11 (Anstead, J., specially concurring). Chief Justice Kogan and
Justice Shaw joined the Anstead concurrence.
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a constitutional protection of the right to appeal."' The court went on to
articulate the test now applicable to legislative restrictions on the
defendant's appellate right: "[T]he legislature may implement this
constitutional right and place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they
do not thwart the litigants' legitimate appellate rights. Of course, this Court
to have jurisdiction over the practice and procedure relating to
continues1 24
appeals.'

The appeal provision of Florida's C.P.C. fails this test. The C.P.C.
creates a guidelines scheme establishing a presumptively correct sentence,
allows the state to appeal downward departures from this presumptively
correct sentence, but disallows defense appeals of upward departures. It is
difficult to imagine a less "reasonable" scheme, or any clearer effort to
"thwart" the "legitimate appellate rights" of criminal defendants. The
C.P.C.'s modification of the state's sentencing guidelines is unreasonable
because it is an unprecedented skewing of appellate rights. No other state,
whether employing determinate or indeterminate sentencing, has taken the
step of giving the state a greater right to appeal than the right accorded to
defendants. Even more importantly, Florida's scheme thwarts the
legitimate expectation of litigants by constructing an enforceable
guidelines system, and then tantalizing defendants by giving the state the
right to enforce that system but depriving defendants of the same right. The
Florida courts should exercise their responsibility to vindicate federal and
state constitutional rights, as well as their jurisdiction over appellate

123. Id. at 1104 (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)). The state constitutional guarantee of access
to courts, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, could also be cited in support of this holding.
124. 696 So. 2d at 1104-05 (footnote omitted). For a more recent application of this test, see
Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So. 2d 267,269 (Fla. 1998); see also Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d 1225,
1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (per Altenbemd, J.) (refusing to follow FLA. STAT. § 924.051(3) (1997),
which limits appellate review of issues not "properly preserved," regarding illegal sentences). The
court emphasizes the constitutional underpinnings of its holding as follows:
[A]ppellate judges take an oath to uphold the law and the constitution of this state.
The citizens of this state properly expect thesejudges to protect their rights. When
reviewing an appeal with a preserved issue, if we discover that a person has been
subjected to a patently illegal sentence to which no objection was lodged in the
trial court, neither the constitution nor our own consciences will allow us to
remain silent .... If three appellate judges, like a statue of the "see no evil, hear
no evil, speak no evil" monkeys, declined to consider such serious, patent errors,
we would jeopardize the public's trust and confidence in the institution of courts
of law. Under separation of powers, we conclude that the legislature is not
authorized to restrict our scope or standard of review in an unreasonable manner

Id. at 1230.
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practice and procedure, by disapproving the appeal provision of Florida's
C.P.C.
C. Florida'sCriminalPunishment Code and Due Process
In applying the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution,
courts must give more specific content to the clause's exceedingly general
language. An important instance of this process is the United States
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Wardius v. Oregon.125 Having
previously approved a Florida rule which required the defendant to give
notice of the intention to present an alibi and imposed reciprocal notice
requirements on the state,'26 the Court in Wardius faced a similar Oregon
provision which significantly failed to impose any reciprocal
responsibilities on the state.'27 Without a single dissenting vote, the Court
found that this nonreciprocal notice rule violated due process.
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall first asserted that in criminal
cases "the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal
discovery," and that "[t]he growth of such discovery devices is a salutary
development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties,
enhances the fairness of the adversary system." Indeed, these goals had
been significant enough to overcome the self-incrimination arguments
lodged against the Florida rule. 2 But Oregon's notice-of-alibi provision
did not sufficiently serve these goals because it was not reciprocal: "[I]n
the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery
must be a two-way street. The state may not insist that trials be run as a
'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while
maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses."' 129 Thus, the
Court particularized the broad language of the Due Process Clause, causing
it to "speak
to the balance of forces between the accused and his
30
accuser."1
Wardius' embrace of the principle of reciprocity has obvious
application to the appeal provision of Florida's C.P.C. Just as the Court in
DiFrancesco loosened the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause in
order to attain the mutual benefits of appellate review of sentences,' 3' so
had the Court earlier reduced the demands of the privilege against self-

125. 412 U.S. 470, 479 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas concurred in the
result, the latter with an opinion and the former without. See id. at 479.
126. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
127. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72.
128. Id. at 473-74.
129. Id. at 475 (footnote omitted) (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 82).
130. Id.
at 474. See generally William J.Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781,
834-35 (1988).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
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incrimination in order to approve Florida's notice-of-alibi rule and thereby
to obtain the mutual benefits of liberal discovery. But when Oregon tried
to force discovery on the defendant without giving up anything in return,
the Court found a due process violation,' just as the courts should find
due process violated by the nonreciprocal appellate rights in Florida's
C.P.C. Like discovery, sentencing appeals should be a two-way street.'33
The state should not be able to protect its "winnings" in the sentencing
game played in trial court by prohibiting defense appeals of upward
departures, while sanctimoniously searching for sentencing "truth" by
exercising its right to appeal downward departures. Due process should not
allow the balance of forces between the state and the defendant to be so
viciously skewed.
The guarantee of due process found in the Florida Constitution134 is as
commodious and flexible as the federal clause, 35 and provides further
justification for striking down the C.P.C.'s appeal provision. Indeed, given
the greater protection that the Florida Constitution gives to the defendant's
right to appeal, 36 concern for reciprocity in the allocation of criminal
appellate rights should be even greater under the state constitution.
Whether the Wardius principle is viewed as a matter of federal or state
constitutional law, it strongly counsels the unconstitutionality ofthe appeal
provision of the C.P.C.
D. Florida'sCriminalPunishment Code and Proportionality
While it is clear that the appellate review provision of Florida's C.P.C.
violates both the federal and state constitutions and should be struck down
for that reason, in the event Florida courts choose to enforce it, those courts
should at least recognize that upward departures imposed pursuant to the
C.P.C. are much more likely to be disproportionate to the defendant's
crime, and thus to violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment in the United States Constitution' and against cruel or
unusual punishment in the Florida Constitution. '3 Without appellate
review of upward departures under Florida's C.P.C., the likely result will
be much longer sentences in individual cases. And because of the lack of
appellate review, these long sentences will be imposed in a random

132. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72.
133. See generally United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 45-46 (D.D.C. 1997) (approving
the "congressionally-mandated symmetry and... equal opportunity to appeal sentences" under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
134. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
135. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
138. FLA. CONST. art, I § 17.
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fashion, producing arbitrary and perhaps discriminatory results. Thus there
should be a notable increase in the numbers of defendants claiming that
their lengthy sentences are disproportionate to their crimes and therefore
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the need for courts
to respond to these claims should also increase.
The currently applicable standard for judging disproportionality under
the federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause appears in Justice
Kennedy's opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in
Harmelin v. Michigan.'39 A court reviewing a sentence should weigh the
three factors previously identified as significant in Solem v. Helm: 4 0 "the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty"; "the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction"; and "the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."' 141 But
a court should advert to the last two factors only when the first or
"threshold" factor "leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' ' 42
Applying this standard, Justice Kennedy upheld the life-withoutpossibility-of-parole sentence mandated by Michigan law for possession
of 650 or more grams of cocaine, without either an intra- or inter43
jurisdictional comparison of the sentence given for similar crimes.
Justice Kennedy reasoned that "the Michigan legislature could with reason
conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society by possession
of this large an amount of cocaine-in terms of violence, crime, and social
displacement-is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and
retribution of a life sentence without parole."'"4
Upward departures under the Florida C.P.C. differ fundamentally from
the flat-time sentence 145 upheld in Harmelin, and for this reason should be
held to fail the threshold factor under Justice Kennedy's test. Apparently,
because of the seriousness of the crime, Michigan had decided that all
possessors of illegal drugs of sufficient quantity deserved life without
possibility of parole. On the contrary, by adopting a mechanism to
determine a guidelines sentence, the Florida Legislature decided only that

139. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Court in Harmelin split three ways, with Justice Kennedy's
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, holding the crucial middle position. Cf id. at
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (proportionality should have no application to
962-94 (Scalia, J.,
sentences of imprisonment); id. at 1018-27 (White, J., dissenting,joined by Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ.) (applying astricter test for proportionality than that advocated by Justice Kennedy); id. at 1027
dissenting) (agreeing with Justice White).
(Marshall, J.,
140. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
141. Id. at 290-92.
142. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 960, 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
143. See id. at 1001-02.
144. Id.at 1003.
145. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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defendants deserve the sentences appropriate to them under the guidelines,
which take into account offense severity, previous history, and any other
determinants deemed relevant by the legislature. Indeed, the guidelines
mechanism is explicitly designed to satisfy the first of the Harmelin
factors: to match the severity of the sentence to the gravity of the
defendant's crime. So, any upward departure from a guidelines sentence
necessarily fails the first Harmelinfactor, because the sentence exceeds the
gravity of the crime as determined by the guidelines, thus requiring
application of the second and third Harmelin factors.
Under previous Florida sentencing law, the appellate courts satisfied
their responsibilities under Harmelin by reviewing upward departures
under the somewhat different standards developed by case law and
legislation for that purpose.'46 By trying to make upward departures
unreviewable, however, the appeal provision of Florida's C.P.C. now will
force courts to be more explicit in applying proportionality review and in
translating the previous standards for review of upward departures into the
language of proportionality.' 47 Nevertheless, it should be clear that the
appeal provision of the C.P.C. does not relieve courts of their federal
constitutional obligation to review upward departures and to strike them
down when they are disproportionate to the defendant's crime.
A similar and arguably greater obligation arises under the Florida
Constitution's ban on cruel or unusual punishment.'48 The few courts that
have applied the proportionality language in the Florida Constitution have
applied the three factors used in both Helm and Harmelin. In Gibson v.
State,'4 9 for example, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal analyzed
a disproportionality challenge to a mandatory sentence of life without
possibility of parole for the crime of sexual battery upon a child.
Upholding the sentence, the court applied all three factors identified by
Justice Kennedy in Harmelin, rather than focusing mainly on the first
146. The focus of upward departure review was more clearly intra-jurisdictional than interjurisdictional, but the effort was the same as under proportionality review, to assure that the upward
departure was not grossly out of line with other decisions in similar cases. See generally State v.
Jones, 685 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1996); Barr v. State, 674 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1996); State v. Darrisaw,
660 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1995); State v. Varner, 616 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993); Barfield v. State, 594 So.
2d 259 (Fla. 1992); Wemett v. State, 567 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990); Mathis v. State, 515 So. 2d 214
(Fla. 1987); State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1986).
147. On the connection between review of upward departures and proportionality, see Jordan
v. State, 562 So. 2d 820,821-22 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (Glickstein, J., concurring specially); see also
Kirby v. State, 553 So. 2d 1290,1291 (Fla. 1stDCA 1989); Fryson v. State, 506 So. 2d 1117,1121
(Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
148. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; cf Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521, 525-26 (Fla. 1993)
(acknowledging that the use of "or" in Florida's constitution creates an "arguably ... broader"
right).
149. 721 So. 2d 363, 366-70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (per Altenbernd, A.C.J.); see also Jordan,
562 So.2d at 822 (Glickstein, J., concurring specially). See generallyHale, 630 So. 2d at 525-26.
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factor, the legislature's judgment of the seriousness of the offense. 5°
Regarding that factor, the court significantly noted: "[W]e do not question
the legislature's wisdom in deciding that this crime is a very grave offense
warranting severe punishment. Child sexual predation is a serious
to the legislature's choice of a flatconcern."'' The court thus deferred
52
time sentence, as in Harmelin1
Where, however, the legislature has not set a flat-time sentence, but has
instead established a presumptively correct sentence pursuant to guidelines
but then has allowed a sentencing court to deviate from that presumptively
correct sentence without articulating any reason, there is no legislative
judgment of seriousness to which to defer. The guidelines sentence reflects
the legislature's assessment of the seriousness of the defendant's crime,
rendering any upward deviation constitutionally suspect as a
disproportionate sentence. Consequently, if the departure sentence fails the
criteria imposed by the second or third Harmelin factor-if it deviates
substantially from the sentences imposed on similar defendants in Florida
or in other states-it should be found cruel or unusual under the Florida
Constitution. In this way, the appeal provision of Florida's C.P.C., if not
held unconstitutional on its face, should surely cause the Florida courts to
strike down as disproportionate many individual sentences rendered
pursuant to that provision.
IV. CONCLUSION

There are two principal ways for the legislature to cure the
constitutional defects in the C.P.C. detailed in this article2 The legislature
could return to its pre-1998 model of guidelines sentencing, allowing
prosecution and defense appeals from departure sentences on an equal
footing, or it could regress to the pre-1983 era of discretionary sentencing
within the statutory minimums and maximums by completely abolishing
sentencing guidelines.'3 The first option is far more preferable, because as

150. See Gibson, 721 So. 2d at 368 (finding that the sentence constitutionally satisfactory
under all three factors).
151. Id.
152. Cf Hale, 630 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Leftwich v. State, 589 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1991)) ("[t]he length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of
legislative prerogative").
153. Either approach would grant equivalent status to the prosecution and the defense and thus
avoid the doublejeopardy, right-to-appeal, and due process difficulties previously noted. See supra
text accompanying notes 94-136. While concerns about disproportionality, see supra text
accompanying notes 139-52, would be greater under discretionary sentencing than under a
guidelines regime, at least a discretionary sentencing scheme would avoid the embarrassment of a
statutorily established guideline sentence from which the court is nevertheless empowered to depart
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one commentator states, "[S]entencing guidelines are the best way to
achieve proportionality and uniformity in the sentencing of criminal
offenders."' 54
Reducing sentencing disparity was a worthy goal when Florida
implemented sentencing guidelines in 1983, and it remains a worthy goal
today. By allowing unreviewable upward departures, the appeal provision
of Florida's C.P.C. seriously undermines this goal. As previously
demonstrated, the provision is unconstitutional on a variety of grounds; to
cure its unconstitutionality by expanding the unreviewability of criminal
sentences would "solve" one set of problems only to create a set of greater
ones. The true solution is to remove the provision from Florida law,
returning to a regime of reciprocal rights to appellate review of guidelines
sentences.

upward, without giving reasons.
154. Barrett, supra note 95, at 1078; see id. at 1110-14, 1116; see also Richard S. Frase, The
UncertainFuture ofSentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 33-36 (1993). These goals are
sufficiently important for the authors of this article - who believe that the presumptive sentences
dictated by the current guidelines are already much too high - to favor an overall increase in
presumptive sentences over abandonment of the guidelines.

